This LRA Crisis Tracker Annual Security Brief provides a summary and analysis of the reported activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) from January - December 2011 in Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo), South Sudan, and Central African Republic (CAR).

The LRA reportedly killed 144 civilians in 2011, a 78.0% reduction from the 654 reported killings in 2010. The group also abducted 595 people in 2011, a 47.3% reduction from the 1,130 reported abductions in 2010. 284 reported LRA attacks occurred in 2011, a 32.4% decrease from the 420 reported attacks in 2010.

Within 2011, reported LRA activity declined dramatically as the year progressed. LRA Crisis Tracker data showed an 83.9% reduction in reported civilian fatalities and an 74.5% reduction in civilian abductions in the second half of 2011. Overall, the LRA reportedly committed 203 attacks in the first half of the year and 81 attacks in the second half of the year. While the cause of this reduction in attacks is not clear, there is little evidence that LRA operational capacity significantly diminished over the course of the year.

Coinciding with the start of this reduction in LRA violence, numerous accounts report that Joseph Kony summoned his key command leadership to rendezvous with his unit in CAR between the months of July and September. By September, reports revealed that commanders had again dispersed and several LRA groups were headed south towards the CAR-Congo border.

426 individuals reportedly returned from LRA captivity in 2011, including many who escaped immediately or soon after being abducted. LRA commanders released 2 large groups of women and children in 2011, a group of 17 near Duru, Congo in October and a group of 13 near Bangadi, Congo in November.
TRENDS IN LRA ACTIVITY

JANUARY - MAY
The LRA reportedly committed 42 attacks in January 2011, the most since May 2010. Reported attacks steadily decreased over the next 4 months, tapering to 23 in May. During this period, Joseph Kony and Okot Odhiambo were believed to be operating in eastern CAR, while Dominic Onigwen and a number of mid-level commanders were believed to be operating in Haut Uele and Bas Uele districts in northern Congo.

JUNE
The decline in reported LRA attacks was abruptly interrupted in June 2011 when LRA forces reportedly carried out 54 attacks, a majority of which occurred in Haut Uele. LRA forces reportedly killed 35 people and abducted 75 others during this month. This was the highest rate of LRA attacks in 15 months, and also included the highest number of lootings in the LRA Crisis Tracker’s entire 25-month dataset.

JULY - SEPTEMBER
Multiple sources reported that Joseph Kony summoned key LRA commanders to rendezvous in eastern CAR between July and September. These reports indicate that he sent 6 Ugandan Acholi officers to locate commanders operating in remote regions of Haut Uele and Bas Uele. By September LRA groups who gathered there reportedly had again split up, with some headed south toward the CAR - Congo border. Simultaneous to these movements, reported attacks dropped significantly from a peak of 54 in June to 12 in September.

OCTOBER - DECEMBER
LRA attack levels during these months were among the lowest recorded in the LRA Crisis Tracker dataset. The LRA reportedly committed 29 attacks, killing 4 people and abducting 37 others, during this period. Overall, reported LRA attacks dropped by 60.1%, killings by 83.9%, and abductions by 74.5% between the first and second halves of 2011.
REPORTED LRA ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS

Approximately 60% of reported LRA attacks in 2011 occurred within an area encompassing parts of Haut Uele district in Congo and Yambio county in South Sudan, which combined represents only approximately 15% of the total area affected by LRA attacks during the year.

This area is roughly bounded by 3 primary regional roads and axes of population concentration: to the south by the Aba-Faradje-Dungu-Niangara east-west road in Congo; to the west by the Doruma-Bangadi-Niangara north-south road in Congo; and to the north by the Maridi-Yambio-Nzara-Ezo east-west road (see map on page 2). This area includes Congo’s Garamba National Park, where several LRA groups are believed to be operating.

In total, 78.2% of all reported LRA attacks in 2011 occurred in Congo and 9.9% in South Sudan. Aside from the area described above, notable concentrations of reported attacks included the areas surrounding the towns of Banda and Ango in Congo’s Bas Uele district and within Tambura county in South Sudan’s Western Equatoria State.

12.0% of reported LRA attacks in 2011 occurred in CAR, where LRA leader Joseph Kony is believed to have spent the entire year. Reported LRA attacks in CAR were concentrated along Bambouti-Obo-Zemio-Rafai road.
NOTABLE ATTACKS

KEY
Date | Community, Admin. Div., Country
Incident Description [Incident Rating: Confidence in incident accuracy from 1 - 5, LRA Rating: Confidence in LRA involvement at Low, Medium, High, or Confirmed]

24FEB | Bamangana, Bas Uele, Congo
A large, well-armed group of at least 50 LRA members attacked the town of Bamangana, in Bas Uele. During the attack they reportedly abducted 28 and killed 8, including 6 security forces. [5, High]

6MAR | Road west of Banda, Bas Uele, Congo
A group of approximately 30 LRA members attacked a World Food Programme convoy carrying 240 tons of food. Food and other supplies were stolen. [5, Confirmed]

13MAR | Nzako, Haute Kotto, CAR
In potentially the deadliest attack of 2011, a sizable force of LRA members attacked the village of Nzako, CAR killing 6 to 9 people, abducting between 30 to 45 others, and looting many homes. LRA forces additionally looted a CAR police station and military post, reportedly taking a mobile HF radio, 6 light machine guns, and other weapons. [3, Medium]

6JUN | Road east of Dembia, Haut Mbomou, CAR
LRA members reportedly attacked a truck containing the chief medical officer of the Haut Mbomou prefecture on the road ~10km east of Dembia, CAR (~75km west of Zemio). In the course of the attack, 3 of the passengers successfully escaped. However, the attackers killed the driver of the vehicle, along with the chief medical officer. Additionally, they destroyed a vital store of polio vaccines being transported to the region. Following the attack, a group of medical professionals marched in protest in Bangui - with other towns in SE CAR experiencing similar demonstrations - demanding an end to the CAR government’s and the Ugandan military’s failure to adequately protect civilians from the LRA. [5, Confirmed]

17JUN | Kidi, Western Equatoria, South Sudan
On the evening of 17 June, 6-7 LRA members reportedly attacked the community of Kidi in South Sudan. The LRA abducted two children - a 14 year-old boy and a 12 year-old girl - and wounded a third community member in the attack. In response, the local Arrow Boy self-defense group pursued the attackers. After clashing with the perpetrators, the Arrow Boys recovered the abducted children and killed an unconfirmed number of LRA members. [3, Medium]

4SEPT | Raga, Western Bahr El Ghazal, South Sudan
A large group of LRA reportedly attacked a police station, clinic, and several households, abducting 4 people and looting food, household goods, and AK-47s. Raga, reportedly attacked by the LRA multiple times in 2011, was the northernmost location of a reported LRA attack in 2011. [3, Medium]
REPORTED KILLINGS AND ABDUCTIONS OF CIVILIANS

Total reported killings of civilians: 144
Total reported abductions of civilians: 595

Totals by country for 2011: Congo, 108 killed and 373 abducted; CAR, 13 killed and 168 abducted; South Sudan, 23 killed and 54 abducted. In 2011, 70.8% of reported LRA attacks (201 total) included either a killing or an abduction of a civilian.

Reported Killings
The percentage of reported LRA attacks involving a killing dropped steadily throughout 2011, as displayed by quarterly calculations: January - March (40.9%), April - June (28.0%), July - September (19.2%), October - December (10.3%). On average in 2011, LRA forces killed 0.51 people per reported attack, with a reduction by more than half from 0.61 killings per attack between January and June to 0.25 between July and December.

Reported Abductions
LRA forces abducted an average of 2.10 people per reported attack in 2011, with the first half of the year measured at an average rate of 2.33 and the second half cut to 1.49. The percentage of reported attacks involving an abduction for each quarter is as follows: January - March (54.5%), April - June (52.7%), July - September (65.4%), and October - December (24.1%).
Reported LRA abductions decreased by nearly half from 1130 individuals in 2010 to 595 individuals in 2011. However, reported LRA returnees increased by 17.5% from 361 in 2010 to 424 in 2011. Monthly net losses in LRA recruitment (No. of abductions minus No. of returnees) were recorded in July, November and December of 2011.

293 reported returnees were recorded in Congo, 111 in CAR, and 20 in South Sudan in 2011.

Reported returnees by quarter shows a downward trend in 2011, with 146 reported returnees January – March, 146 April – June, 79 July – September, and 53 October – December. These trends roughly correspond to the decreasing levels of LRA attacks and abductions throughout the year.

**SUMMARY OF REPORTED RETURNEES [JAN. -DEC. 2011]**

Reported LRA abductions decreased by nearly half from 1130 individuals in 2010 to 595 individuals in 2011. However, reported LRA returnees increased by 17.5% from 361 in 2010 to 424 in 2011. Monthly net losses in LRA recruitment (No. of abductions minus No. of returnees) were recorded in July, November and December of 2011.

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**REPORTED ABDUCTIONS VS. RETURNEES [2010 - 2011]**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Abductions</th>
<th>Returnees</th>
<th>Net Recruitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1130</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>+770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>+171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTABLE REPORTED RETURNEE INCIDENTS [JAN. -DEC. 2011]**

2NOV | Bangadi, Haut Uele
13 people (6 women and 7 children) surrendered near Bangadi in Haut Uele. Combatants from 2 different LRA groups guided them to a place where they could surrender easily and released them. Several of the women had been abducted from northern Uganda and spent over 10 years in LRA captivity. [5, confirmed]

9OCT | Duru, Haut Uele
17 women and children surrendered near Duru in Haut Uele. They were released by 8 LRA combatants and reported that these combatants were also interested in surrendering. Their LRA group was commanded by Brig. Ocan Bunia, whom they reported had died of natural causes in September 2011. [4, High]
METHODOLOGY

The following is a summary of the data sources, verification methods, and definitions of key terms used to produce the LRA Crisis Tracker Annual Security Brief (henceforward the “Brief”). Data utilized in the Brief is drawn from the LRA Crisis Tracker Database (henceforward the “Database”) and summarized within the Brief to illustrate the activities of the LRA – including attacks, killings, and abductions – and their impact on civilian populations over time.

For more detailed information regarding data governance policies, verification ratings, and logging procedures utilized to create the Database, please refer to the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.0 at LRACrisisTracker.com.

Data Sourcing

Data found within the Brief originates from the Database, a geospatial dataset pertaining to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and violent conflict in LRA-affected regions in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan (S. Sudan), and the Central African Republic (CAR). Data for the Database is gathered from reports produced by non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies; open source news outlets; government agencies; firsthand research conducted by Invisible Children, Resolve, and peer organizations; and civilian-controlled high frequency (HF) early-warning radio networks in LRA-affected areas.

LRA Crisis Tracker Database team members make every effort to obtain data from all LRA-affected regions. The quality and comprehensiveness of the data is largely dependent on the sourcing infrastructure accessible to project administrators. Due to the remote nature of LRA-affected regions, this sourcing infrastructure is uneven across the geographic area of concern. Data included in the Database and the Brief tend to be of greater quality in areas that are more heavily trafficked by NGOs and news agencies, but even in these regions, data on LRA incidents is not comprehensive. The LRA Crisis Tracker Database does not claim to be a comprehensive record of all LRA incidents or related events in the region, but team members make every effort to fill in areas where the data may not be easily accessible.

Data Verification

Two different rating systems are utilized to assess the accuracy of details included in any incident report logged in the Database. The first system assesses confidence in details surrounding the incident as a whole, and the second assesses confidence in whether or not the LRA was a perpetrator of violence in a given incident.

Incident Verification Rating

The Incident Verification Rating assesses confidence in the accuracy of each incident report as a whole based on information available to LRA Crisis Tracker data coders. Each incident is given a rating of “1” through “5,” with “1” being the most unreliable and “5” being very reliable. The rating is based on the reliability of the source, whether or not the source itself portrays the incident as reliable (e.g., if the report use words like “alleged” or “potential,” its rating would be downgraded), confidence in the identity of the actors involved in the incident, and the degree of detail given in the source report. A verification rating of “2” through “5” is considered adequately verified to be reported publicly, and therefore is included in this Brief. For a detailed explanation of the Incident Verification Rating system, please refer to section 4.2 (a) of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.0. Incident Verification Ratings for individual attacks found within the Brief can be found through the ‘Get Reports’ sub-heading at LRACrisisTracker.com.

LRA Actor Verification Scale

The LRA Actor Verification Scale measures the degree of confidence that members of the armed group involved in an incident were members of the LRA, based on information available to LRA Crisis Tracker data coders. The scale takes into account the type of event, the number of primary sources, and the number of indicators observed in the incident that are typically correlated with the LRA. For a detailed explanation of the LRA Actor Verification Scale, please refer to section 4.2 (c) of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.0. LRA Verification Ratings for individual attacks found within the Brief can be found through the ‘Get Reports’ sub-heading at LRACrisisTracker.com.

Key Definitions

The following are the operative definitions for key terms used in the Brief.

Attack

An incident is considered an “attack” in the Brief if LRA activity results in one of the following human rights violations: violence resulting in death or injury, sexual or gender-based violence, abduction, looting, or displacement. For detailed definitions of these human rights abuses, please refer to section 4.5 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.0.

Killing

An incident is regarded as a “killing” if there is a violent act that results in the death of an individual who is not known to be associated with an armed group or security force. This includes a civilian death that results from an injury sustained previously by LRA violence. If a civilian is killed while in LRA captivity, it is considered a “killing” if it occurs within one week of the initial abduction. For a detailed explanation of incidents that are categorized as a “killing”, please refer to section 4.5.1 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.0.

Abduction

An incident is regarded as an “abduction” if it involves one or more persons taken hostage against their will by the LRA for any period of time. This includes incidents in which LRA members abduct civilians and release them later the same day. For a detailed explanation of data relating to LRA-perpetrated abduction, please refer to section 4.5.2 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.0.

Returnees

A returnee is considered anyone who escapes, is released, is rescued, or defects from LRA captivity. This field does not include LRA members who are captured. For a detailed explanation of data relating to returnees, please refer to section 4.5.2 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.0.

RETURNEES
ABOUT RESOLVE

Resolve is a Washington D.C.-based advocacy organization seeking to move U.S. and international political leaders to take the actions needed to see a permanent end to the violence of the Lord’s Resistance Army in Central Africa and justice to LRA-affected communities. Learn more at theresolve.org.

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ABOUT INVISIBLE CHILDREN

Invisible Children is an international NGO working to assist communities in LRA-affected areas of Central Africa by expanding community-based early warning systems, reaching out to potential LRA defectors and affected communities through FM radio, and rehabilitating formerly-abducted children. Learn more at invisiblechildren.com.

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INVISIBLE CHILDREN + RESOLVE LRA CRISIS TRACKER

FURTHER RESOURCES

For a real-time, geospatial look at LRA activity, or to download the data found within the Quarterly Security Brief please visit the LRA Crisis Tracker Map at: LRACrisisTracker.com.

ABOUT THE LRA CRISIS TRACKER

Data reflected in this brief was collected as part of the Invisible Children + Resolve LRA Crisis Tracker, a geospatial database and reporting project which aims to track incidents of violent conflict in areas of Central Africa affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Through publication of regular reports and open-source sharing of collected data, the LRA Crisis Tracker aims to help overcome the current deficit of relevant and timely information related to the LRA crisis and to support improved policy and humanitarian responses.

In the interest of continually strengthening the LRA CrisisTracker dataset, Resolve and Invisible Children welcome new sources of current or historical reports of LRA activity. To contribute information to the LRA Crisis Tracker project, please contact Resolve at LRACrisisTracker@theresolve.org.

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