



LRA  
**CRISIS**  
TRACKER

MID-YEAR  
SECURITY BRIEF  
[JAN.-JUNE 2012]

A PUBLICATION OF  
INVISIBLE CHILDREN + RESOLVE  
*LRACrisisTracker.com*

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

	LRA ATTACKS	KILLINGS	ABDUCTIONS	RETURNEES
July - Dec. 2011	83	22	137	201
Jan. - June 2012	190	38	311	230
% change	+129%	+73%	+127%	+14%


The Mid-Year Security Brief provides a summary and analysis of the reported activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from January – June 2012 (analysis period). This brief covers LRA activity in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo), South Sudan, and Sudan.

Reported LRA attacks rose sharply during the analysis period, increasing by 129% from the latter half of 2011. LRA forces reportedly committed 190 attacks from January – June 2012, in which they killed 38 people and abducted 311 others. From July – December 2011, LRA forces reportedly committed 83 attacks, in which they killed 22 people and abducted 137 others.

LRA activity differed significantly across the region during the analysis period, underscoring the continued fragmentation of LRA groups. 82% (155) of reported LRA attacks occurred in Congo, comprised of mostly lootings and small-scale abductions. In CAR, LRA forces committed as many attacks (35) as they did throughout all of 2011, and reportedly killed twice as many people as they did in 2011. Notable LRA activity there included an attack on a French uranium mine near Bakouma. No attacks within South Sudan have been reported since September 2011.

No LRA attacks were reported in Sudan either from January – June 2012, but senior LRA commanders, including Joseph Kony, reportedly sought refuge in Sudan's South Darfur region. Other senior commanders, including Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo, reportedly remained in southeast CAR. On May 12, Ugandan military forces apprehended Caesar Achellam, another senior LRA commander, along the CAR-Congo border.

In addition to Achellam, 230 combatants and abductees returned from the LRA from January – June 2012. This marked a 14% increase from the last six months of 2011. In May and June 2012, more people reportedly escaped from the LRA than were abducted, the first months this occurred since November 2011. Notable defections included Achellam's bodyguard, who escaped on June 26 with five other LRA officers after being blamed for allowing Achellam to escape.



## NOTABLE POLITICAL CONTEXT & DEVELOPMENTS

### Escalation of regional conflict

During the reporting period, armed conflict escalated significantly in east and central Africa. In eastern Congo, the M23 rebellion sparked a humanitarian crisis and increased tension between Congo and Rwanda. It also compelled the Congolese government to redeploy 750 US-trained troops from LRA-affected areas to North Kivu province. In CAR, the *Front Populaire pour le Redressement* (FPR) and other armed groups continue to pose a significant danger to the national government. Border skirmishes continued between Sudanese and South Sudanese forces, including along the border between South Darfur and Western Bahr el-Ghazal states where LRA forces have been reported.


### Launch of AU and UN LRA initiatives

In March 2012 the African Union officially launched its Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA). The initiative includes a Regional Task Force (RTF) composed of national military forces already deployed in LRA-affected areas and a Joint Coordination Mechanism (JCM) to improve diplomatic coordination between LRA-affected governments. In June, AU LRA envoy Ambassador Francisco Madeira and UN special representative for Central Africa Abou Moussa briefed the UN Security Council on the LRA. Following the briefing, the Council approved a new UN LRA strategy that seeks to support the AU's RCI-LRA and coordinate the activity of UN actors operating in LRA-affected areas.

### Deployment of US military advisers

Following an announcement by President Obama in October 2011, US military advisers were deployed to central and east Africa to assist in regional counter-LRA efforts, primarily working with the Ugandan military. A majority of the advisers are based in Uganda, with forward bases in Nzara, South Sudan, and Obo and Djemah, CAR. The advisers have a limited presence in Congo, where Ugandan troops have not been allowed to officially operate since September 2011.

# REPORTED LRA ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIANS



24-MONTH SUMMARY OF REPORTED LRA ATTACKS BY COUNTRY

## ATTACK SUMMARY

[JAN. -JUNE 2012]

The 190 total reported attacks indicate a sharp increase in LRA violence compared to the latter half of 2011 (83 reported LRA attacks), and a return to levels of violence seen in the first half of 2011 (204 reported LRA attacks).

In addition, there were 59 known attacks on civilians in LRA-affected areas from January – June in which the perpetrators were unknown. Fifteen people were killed and 44 abducted in incidents attributed to unknown armed groups.

LRA forces could be responsible for some of these attacks, as could bandits, rogue military personnel, or other groups. (For more information on how the LRA Crisis Tracker assesses the identity of perpetrators of attacks, see page 12).


## REPORTED ATTACKS BY COUNTRY

[JAN. -JUNE 2012]




## ATTACK PERPETRATED BY LRA VS. UNKNOWN ARMED GROUP

[JAN. -JUNE 2012]



# CONGO: SHIFTING PATTERNS OF LRA ACTIVITY



## Haut Uele: South of the GNP complex

LRA attacks in Congo during the reporting period were concentrated in Haut Uele district, where Garamba National Park and the surrounding reserves (Garamba complex) are located. Reported LRA attacks were clustered south of the Garamba complex, particularly along the road between Dungu and Faradje **1** and around the town of Faradje **2**. Reported activity south of the Garamba complex declined from an estimated 30 attacks from January – March to an estimated 5 attacks from April – June. The UN peacekeeping mission in Congo (MONUSCO) has troops stationed in both Dungu and Faradje.

## Haut Uele: West of the GNP complex

Reported LRA attacks were also concentrated west of the Garamba complex, where the areas surrounding the towns of Bangadi **3** and Ngilima **4** suffered the most reported attacks. These areas saw consistent levels of violence from January – June 2012. MONUSCO has deployments in both Bangadi and Ngilima.

There were also high levels of attacks committed by unknown armed groups west of the GNP complex, with 47% of all reported attacks by unknown armed groups in the first half of 2012 occurring there.

## Bas Uele:

Reports of LRA activity in Bas Uele district, directly east of Haut Uele district, increased significantly in the first half of 2012 (17 attacks) compared with the latter half of 2011 (11 attacks). This increase in LRA activity, combined with the lack of telecommunications infrastructure and civilian protection actors in the area, has led to concerns that LRA forces could use Bas Uele as a safe haven.

The highest concentration of reported LRA activity in Bas Uele was around the town of Banda **5**. Notably, LRA forces reportedly committed one abduction of 13 people and two separate abductions of 10 people in Bas Uele, the three largest reported abductions by LRA forces in Congo during the first half of 2012.

# CONGO: REPORTED LRA ACTIVITY IN THE GARAMBA COMPLEX

## History of LRA activity in the GNP complex


LRA forces led by now-deceased commander Vincent Otti first entered Garamba National Park in 2005. Joseph Kony later joined the group, and the LRA established several bases and farms in the park during peace talks with the Ugandan government from 2006-2008. In December 2008 the Ugandan military bombed LRA camps there, and two weeks later the LRA retaliated by killing 15 park personnel and destroying \$2 million worth of equipment **1**. LRA activity around the Garamba complex declined in 2010 and early 2011 following the capture of LRA commander Charles Arop in November 2009 **2**.

## Upsurge in LRA activity in the GNP complex in 2012

LRA activity in and around the park increased in late 2011 and early 2012. Park personnel reported finding an LRA camp which had accommodated 50 LRA combatants and 50-60 women and children in April 2012 **3**. In June, park personnel and LRA forces clashed just 12 kilometers from the Garamba National Park headquarters in Nagero, Congo **4**.

## Possible LRA involvement in the illegal ivory trade

Resurgent LRA activity around Garamba National Park has been accompanied by an increase in elephant poaching, and park officials believe LRA forces may be engaged in the illegal ivory trade. A woman who escaped the LRA in April 2012 reported that LRA groups operating in Garamba National Park were ordered by Kony to kill elephants and send their tusks to him. She also reported witnessing LRA combatants leaving the park with 10 elephant tusks. On May 16, park personnel also reported that they found three dead male elephants and then clashed with suspected LRA forces from whom they confiscated elephant tusks.



# CAR: SIGNIFICANT SURGE IN LRA VIOLENCE

## Increased LRA attacks following Ugandan operations

In 2012, the Ugandan military, the only force in the region with the capacity to pursue LRA groups into remote areas, focused on pursuing LRA groups in southeast CAR thought to contain senior LRA commanders such as Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo. In particular, Ugandan operations concentrated on LRA groups operating in the large forested reserves west of Djemah, CAR **1**. Beginning in late February, reported LRA attacks against civilians living in towns surrounding the forested reserves increased dramatically before declining again from late April through June.


Overall, there were 35 reported LRA attacks in CAR from January – June 2012, equal to the number of LRA attacks there in all of 2011. A majority of reported LRA attacks in the first half of 2012 (67%) occurred in CAR's Mbomou prefecture, a contrast to 2011 when 68% of attacks occurred in the more easterly Haut Mbomou prefecture. LRA groups may be moving further west to escape Ugandan forces and US military advisers, which are based in Haut Mbomou.

## Massacre of gold miners on CAWA hunting reserve

Around March 20, employees of the private CAWA hunting reserve west of Djemah discovered the bodies of 13 murdered artisanal gold miners **2**. Several employees of the hunting reserve have been charged with the murders, but Human Rights Watch issued a statement in July stating that LRA forces, which were active in the area at that time, were “likely” responsible for the attack.

## Attack on uranium mining site near Bakouma

Between June 21 and June 25, LRA forces reportedly committed at least 6 attacks on communities near the town of Bakouma, CAR **3**. This series included a June 24 attack in which approximately 30 LRA combatants raided a uranium mining site owned by the French company Areva, looting food, clothing, electronics, and computers. The LRA abducted 14 people during the series of attacks, a majority of whom were released by the LRA or escaped soon after being abducted.



# SUDAN & S. SUDAN: TRENDS IN LRA ACTIVITY

## South Darfur State and Kafia Kingi enclave (Sudan)

Since 2009, LRA groups have reportedly been active in South Darfur State and the Kafia Kingi enclave, a disputed area along the border between South Darfur (Sudan) and Western Bahr el-Ghazal (South Sudan). The enclave has been incorporated into South Darfur since 1960, and Sudanese troops are deployed in strategic towns such as Dafaq and Kafia Kingi.


An LRA group reportedly made contact with Sudanese forces in the Kafia Kingi enclave in October 2009 **1**. In September 2010, LRA forces clashed with the Darfuri rebel group the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) near Dafaq **2**. LRA forces also reportedly clashed with Darfuri rebel groups in November 2011 **3**. In April 2012, Ugandan military officials and the Sudan Liberation Army - Minni Minawi (SLA-MM), a Darfuri rebel group linked to the Ugandan government, claimed that LRA forces were operating in South Darfur and receiving support from the Sudanese government.

## Western Bahr el-Ghazal State (South Sudan)

The last reported LRA attack in Western Bahr el-Ghazal was in September 2011 on a police station in the town of Deim Jallab, west of Raga **4**. In late 2011, South Sudanese military forces captured LRA combatants in Deim Jallab **5**. Local government officials reported that LRA forces abducted two girls in Mboro on January 7, 2012, but the identity of the perpetrators was not confirmed **6**.


## Western Equatoria State (South Sudan)

Communities in Western Equatoria State (WES) suffered severe LRA attacks in 2008 and 2009 following Uganda's bombing of LRA camps across the border in Congo. LRA groups remained active in WES in 2010 and early 2011, committing 67 attacks. 50,000 people in WES remain displaced due to the LRA, though the last known attack there was in June 2011 **7**.





# REPORTED KILLINGS & ABDUCTIONS OF CIVILIANS BY THE LRA




## SUMMARY OF REPORTED KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS BY THE LRA [JAN. - JUNE 2012]

LRA forces reportedly killed 38 people from January – June 2012. 10% of all reported LRA attacks included a civilian killing. This was a significant drop from 2011, when LRA forces killed a civilian in 29.6% of all reported attacks. In Congo, the LRA reportedly killed 12 people from January – June 2012, and never killed more than one person per attack. The average number of people killed per attack in Congo was 0.08, the lowest recorded ratio in the LRA Crisis Tracker Database, which includes incidents dating to November 2009.

In CAR, reported LRA attacks were significantly more deadly. The LRA reportedly killed 26 people during the analysis period, or 0.74 people per attack. This included the reported massacre of 13 miners on the CAWA hunting reserve and the killing of six civilians near Rafai from March 20 – 21.

## ATTACK TYPE BREAKDOWN [JAN. - JUNE 2012]



Killing and abduction of civilians  
 Killing of civilians  
 Abduction of civilians  
 Neither\*




[\*Attack leading to civilian injury, looting, sexual or gender based violence, or displacement]

## SUMMARY OF REPORTED ABDUCTIONS OF CIVILIANS BY THE LRA [JAN. - JUNE 2012]


From January – June 2012, the LRA reportedly abducted 311 people: 222 in Congo and 89 in CAR. An average of 1.63 people were abducted per attack, though the ratio of abductions to attacks was higher in CAR (2.47) than in Congo (1.43). In 2011, the LRA abducted 2.10 people per attack.

Of these abductions, 47.6% were confirmed as short-term abductions (abductions in which the person escaped or was released within 72 hours). This trend was more pronounced in Congo, where 58.6% of all abductions were reported as short term, while only 20.2% were in CAR. Of abductions in which gender information was reported, 67.3% were male, while 32.7% were female. Of abductions in which age information was reported, 70.6% were reported as adults, while 29.4% were children.

# TRENDS IN REPORTED CIVILIAN ABDUCTIONS BY THE LRA



# REPORTED RETURNEES & ESTIMATED NET RECRUITMENT




## SUMMARY OF REPORTED RETURNEES [JAN. - JUNE 2012]

159 reported returnees were recorded in Congo, 53 in CAR, and 18 in South Sudan in the first six months of 2012. There were 149 reported returnees from January – March, which dropped to 81 from April – June. Reported LRA returnees increased by 14% between the latter half of 2011 (201 returnees) and the first half of 2012 (230 returnees).

**Caesar Achellam:** The most significant returnee incident during this analysis period was the capture of senior LRA commander Caesar Achellam. Ugandan forces reportedly captured Achellam near the Congo-CAR border on May 12, along with two girls and his wife.

Though it is unclear how much influence Achellam had with senior LRA commanders at the time of his capture,

## REPORTED RETURNEES [July 2010 - Jun 2012]



his removal could be demoralizing to rank-and-file LRA combatants. On May 20, two LRA combatants surrendered in Mboki, CAR, citing Achellam’s capture as their reason for defecting. The defection of Achellam’s bodyguard, who escaped with five LRA officers on June 26 after other LRA commanders threatened to kill him, also indicates that Achellam’s capture could cause further divisions within LRA ranks.

*Defection messages:* Over the reporting period, there have also been a number of cases of LRA combatants expressing their desire to defect. In March 2012, LRA forces made three separate contacts with civilians in Nakale, Congo in which they expressed a desire to surrender, including by asking civilians to deliver a letter to UN peacekeepers. On May 20, LRA combatants asked two girls near Nandike, Congo, where they could surrender to security forces.

# CRISIS TRACKER DATA COLLECTION AND VERIFICATION PROCESS

## 1 Data Collection

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### Report sourcing:

- HF Radio Towers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic
  - Civilians report activity to HF radio tower operators
  - Over 30 HF radio operators call the Dungu hub twice daily to report armed group activity
  - Activity is entered into a spreadsheet and then sent to data coders.
- UN and NGO reports
- News and media outlets
- Civil society contacts in local communities
- Government sources
- Field research conducted by Resolve and Invisible Children staff

*Sourcing coverage:* LRA Crisis Tracker Database team members make every effort to obtain data from all LRA-affected regions. Due to the remote nature of LRA-affected areas, the sourcing infrastructure available to project administrators is uneven across the geographic area of concern, and data included in the Database is often of better quality in areas with higher NGO and news agency traffic. The LRA Crisis Tracker Database does not claim to be a comprehensive record of all LRA or related incidents in the region, but team members make every effort to fill in areas where the data may not be easily accessible.

## 2 Data Entry

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*Database entry:* Reports are divided between a team of coders from both Invisible Children and Resolve. Coders determine if the source is reliable or unreliable (See section 4.2.B of the Codebook, Determining the Reliability of a Source). Before an incident is reported, the coder reads through other incidents in the same time range and checks for duplicates.

*Verification rating:* After an incident is categorized, each incident is given a Verification Rating, which rates the team's confidence in the details of the reported data. Each incident is given a rating of "1" through "5," with "1" being the most unreliable and "5" being very reliable. The rating is based on the trustworthiness of the source, confidence in the identity of the actors involved in the incident, and the degree of detail given in the source report. A verification rating of "2" through "5" is considered adequately verified to be reported publicly, and therefore is included in statistics and analysis (Codebook section 4.2A).

*LRA Actor Verification rating:* To distinguish between LRA and other armed group attacks, the Crisis Tracker Codebook has a list of LRA Indicators and Non-LRA Indicators. If after reviewing the indicators and other available evidence the data coder determines that the perpetrator of an attack was likely the LRA, the incident is given an LRA Actor Verification rating, 'Low,' 'Medium,' or 'High,' to measure the likelihood of the perpetrator being LRA. (Codebook section 4.2C.) If after reviewing an incident the coder determines that the LRA was not the perpetrator and the perpetrator is unknown, Actor 1 is marked as 'Armed Group' and the incident is not mapped.

## 3 Data Review

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*Initial review:* Each report is reviewed by a second data coder to catch human errors and duplicate reports. Coders look for incidents that are alike in details, and have a relatively close time frame and location. These incidents are then investigated to ensure that they are not duplicate reports.

*Expert review:* IC and Resolve staff with field experience review sensitive incidents immediately and review *all* incidents every three months. Should this staff member feel an incident was misreported, the incident is corrected and potentially unmapped. External LRA and regional experts are consulted as necessary.

## 4 Data Mapping & Sharing

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*Data mapping:* After an incident is entered and approved to be mapped, it appears on the LRA Crisis Tracker website. Only incidents involving the LRA or persons formerly abducted by the LRA and given a Verification rating of '2' or higher are mapped.

*Data sensitivity:* Sensitive information such as specific sources, names, information on security forces, and personal information about minors is not shared publicly.

*Data sharing:* Data is regularly sent to UN agencies and humanitarian practitioners for comparison and collaboration.

## 5 Data Revamp

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As the database grows and policies are updated to reflect best practices, data coders revisit and "revamp" the data when needed.

With the establishment of the HF Radio Network and expanded reporting mechanisms in the region, incident reporting has become more detailed and the database has been adapted to reflect this. Fields including information on age and gender of victims, and goods looted have been added since the beginning of the database. Coders periodically revisit all incidents and reports to include the new details and fields.

## 6 Data Analysis & Reporting

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Crisis Tracker staff analyze data for trends and patterns in LRA activity. For instance, coders look for trends in the age and gender of abducted persons, net recruitment (total abductions- total returnees), and increases in a certain type of attack. Coders also look for new traits and patterns in LRA activity.

# CRISIS TRACKER DATA COLLECTION AND VERIFICATION PROCESS, ctd

Specific areas and provinces are also analyzed for increases or decreases in number and type of attack.

After analysis has been completed and reviewed, it is reported in various Crisis Tracker reports.

## Definitions

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### *Attack:*

An incident is considered an “attack” in the Brief if LRA activity results in one of the following human rights violations: violence resulting in death or injury, sexual or gender based violence, abduction, looting, or displacement. For detailed definitions of these human rights abuses, please refer to section 4.5 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.3.

### *Killing:*

An incident is regarded as a “killing” if there is a violent act that results in the death of an individual who is not known to be associated with an armed group or security force. Civilian deaths resulting from injuries sustained from an attack are considered a “killing.” Also, if a civilian is killed while in LRA captivity, it is considered a “killing” if it occurs within one week of the initial abduction. For a detailed explanation of incidents that are categorized as a “killing” please refer to section 4.5.1 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.3.

### *Abduction:*

An incident is regarded as an “abduction” if it involves one or more persons taken hostage against their will by the LRA for any period of time, including civilians who are abducted and released or escape in the same day. A short-term abduction is considered any abduction that is 72 hours or less in duration. This does not necessarily mean that abductions that are not short-term are long-term as there may not be a report of the abducted person’s return. For a detailed explanation of incidents categorized as

“abductions” or “short-term abductions,” please refer to section 4.5.2 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.3.

### *Returnees:*

A “returnee” is considered anyone who escapes, is released, is rescued, or defects from LRA captivity. This field does not include LRA members who are captured. For a detailed explanation of data relating to returnees, please refer to section 4.5.2 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.3.

# ABOUT

## RESOLVE

Resolve is a Washington D.C.-based advocacy organization seeking to move U.S. and international political leaders to take the actions needed to see a permanent end to the violence of the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa and justice to LRA-affected communities. Learn more at [theResolve.org](http://theResolve.org).

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## INVISIBLE CHILDREN

Invisible Children is an international NGO working to assist communities in LRA-affected areas of Central Africa by expanding community-based early warning systems, reaching out to potential LRA defectors and affected communities through FM radio, and rehabilitating formerly-abducted children. Learn more at [invisiblechildren.com](http://invisiblechildren.com).

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## FURTHER RESOURCES

For a real-time, geospatial look at LRA activity, or to download the data found within the Mid-Year Security Brief please visit the LRA Crisis Tracker Map at: [LRACrisisTracker.com](http://LRACrisisTracker.com).

## ABOUT THE LRA CRISIS TRACKER

Data reflected in this brief was collected as part of the Invisible Children + Resolve LRA Crisis Tracker, a geospatial database and reporting project which aims to track incidents of violent conflict in areas of Central Africa affected by the Lord's Resistance Army. Through publication of regular reports and open-source sharing of collected data, the LRA Crisis Tracker aims to help overcome the current deficit of relevant and timely information related to the LRA crisis and to support improved policy and humanitarian responses.

In the interest of continually strengthening the LRA Crisis Tracker dataset, Resolve and Invisible Children welcome new sources of current or historical reports of LRA activity. To contribute information to the LRA Crisis Tracker project, please contact Resolve at [LRACrisisTracker@theResolve.org](mailto:LRACrisisTracker@theResolve.org).

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